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PAN-EUROPEAN MUSIC LICENSE AND THE 
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ABSTRACT 
This article tells the story of what could have been an 
interesting and important shift in our approach to territoriality in 
the digitalized world. Europe had the chance to be the cradle of an 
unprecedented copyright experience – the creation of a quasi pan-
continental license in the music field – but it might have lost that 
opportunity in the midst of non-binding recommendations and 
resolutions. This article argues this loss is due to the overreaching 
persistence of old paradigms, namely the principle of territoriality. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In May 2004, the European Commission announced the opening of 
proceedings regarding collective licensing of music copyrights for online 
use, issuing a statement where it recognized that “the loss of territoriality 
brought about by the Internet, as well as the digital format of products such 
as music files, are difficult to reconcile with traditional copyright licensing 
schemes, which are based on purely national procedures.”2  This article 
focuses on the 2005 Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music 
Services, the first-ever formal act from a European Institution to address 
these problems and to attempt to smooth the territoriality principle that  has 
characterized – and obstructed – the relationships between rights-holders, 
collective management rights societies, and commercial users. In order to 
properly understand the meaning and weight that should be accorded to the 
Recommendation, this article first gives a brief overview of the recent 
evolution of the online music market in the European Union, followed by a 
                                                     
1 LLM 2008, SJD candidate, Duke Law School, with some comments and 
contributions by Leonardo Cervera Navas as EU Fellow at Duke University 
(2007–2008). The author would like to thank Mr. Cervera Navas for his helpful 
comments and support. All the opinions expressed in this document are personal 
and in no way represent the views of the European Commission or Duke 
University. All errors and mistakes remains my own, 
2 Press Release, Europa, Commission Opens Proceedings into Collective 
Licensing of Music Copyrights for Online Use (May 3, 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/586. 
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general outline of the dynamics of music licensing from the perspective of 
collective rights management societies.  
¶2 After dissecting the Commission’s Recommendation, this article 
tracks some of the post-2005 developments that were either stimulated by or 
reacted against the Recommendation, including the monitoring carried out 
by the Commission in 2007.  The article concludes with a brief analysis of 
the March 2007 European Parliament Non-Legislative Resolution on the 
Recommendation. 
I. THE PARADOX 
¶3 Europe has been experimenting with territoriality since the middle 
of the 20th century, when the treaty founding the European Commission 
was signed.3 Since then, each one of its Member States has progressively 
lost elements of its sovereignty, in a process that smoothened the European 
Union’s internal frontiers, until it reached a point where people and goods 
benefited from a general “freedom” of moving, living, working and trading 
in different countries.4 However, as Hugenholtz et alia point out, “the 
harmonization process [in Europe] has left largely intact a more serious 
impediment to the creation of an internal market: the territorial nature of 
copyright and related rights.”5 
¶4 A natural question thus emerges: is it the nature of copyright that is 
blocking the harmonization process, or is the harmonization process itself 
flawed and therefore fails to set copyright free from its old territorial 
chains? Hugenholtz believes that the right answer implies both theories: 
“[i]ndeed, for as long as the territorial nature of copyright and related rights 
is left intact, harmonization can achieve very little;”6 on the other hand, “the 
EU legislature has been aiming . . . at the wrong target.”7 The 
harmonization process is paradoxical: it is convergent when it gives away 
more rights and a broadens protection, but that “upwards” attitude has 
detrimental effects in the internal market. It creates a plethora of 
                                                     
3 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pd
f [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
4 See generally id. at 57.  
5 BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, THE RECASTING OF 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 22 (2006), 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast
_report_2006.pdf. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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microscopic rights diffused at the national level, thus impairing the free 
movement of goods and services.8 
¶5 As the following section will show, the advent of online music 
businesses should have been enough of an incentive for Europe to 
reconsider its copyright licensing scheme. 
A. The Online Music Market 
¶6 For the purposes of this article, the “online music market” will be 
defined as “any music service provided on the Internet such as simulcasting, 
webcasting, streaming, downloading, online ‘on-demand’ service or 
provided to mobile telephones.”9 
¶7 Although the downloading of online music is a flourishing business 
in the entire Western world, Europe is particularly attractive because its 
market took off later than the North American market and is likely to 
experience unprecedented growth rates in the coming years. The following 
tables show the results of a comparative study between the markets in the 
United States and the European Union (the numbers for the years 2005 
through 2008 are projections).10 While both markets show the same 
tendency to grow at a fast pace, the ratio of total downloads and 
subscriptions in 2005 to the total in 2008 in the United States was expected 
to grow 2.5 times, whereas in Europe that number was as high as 5.2. But if 
we consider the time span of 2004 to 2008,11  the United States’ ratio was 6, 
while Europe’s was 20, which means at the time the European Commission 
first became interested in the problem of cross-border management of 
digital rights, Europe was on the verge of an explosion. 
   
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Id. at 30. 
9 Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Commission Staff Working Document: Study 
on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of 
Copyright 6 (July 7, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/study-
collectivemgmt_en.pdf [hereinafter Working Document]. 
10 See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, DRM-ENABLED ONLINE CONTENT SERVICES 
IN EUROPE AND THE USA 3 (2005). 
11 2004 is the last year actual data was available.  The European Institutions have 
since based their multi-territorial management decisions on these numbers. 
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Online Music Market, USA12  
 
Online Music Market, Western Europe13 
 
 
¶8 If we consider the ratio of total downloads and subscriptions in 
2005 to the total in 2008 in countries where major collective rights 
management societies operate, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France and Italy, we find numbers that range from 4.1, in the UK, to an 
expressive 7.4, in Italy. 
Online Music Market, UK14 
 
Online Music Market, Germany15 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 10, at 5. 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. at 12. 
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Online Music Market, France16 
 
Online Music Market, Italy17 
 
 
¶9 In smaller countries, where collective management societies are 
either deficient or less developed, the numbers show the same ascending 
tendency. Take the example of Portugal where, although collective 
management exists, they are not compulsory by law, and where the ratio of 
total downloads and subscriptions in 2005 to the total in 2008 exceeds 6.6, a 
number that places the country on the same level as France. 
Online Music Market, Portugal18 
 
 
¶10  Finally, the same pattern applies in an even more explosive way to 
the ten Member States that joined the European Union in 2004: between 
2004 and 2005 their ratio was 3, but if we look to the period comprised 
between 2005 and 2008, then the numbers increase to 19.88. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 Id. at 16. 
17 Id. at 36. 
18 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 10, at 41. 
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Online Music Market, New Member States19 
 
 
¶11 As of today, the numbers available confirm the projection of the 
studies the Commission used while framing the problem of transnational 
music licensing, and similar growth patterns are expected over the next few 
years20. 
¶12 While reviewing this data, the Commission Staff framed its own 
role as a fixing task: “For 2005, online music revenue is expected to rise to 
€ 106.4 million within Western Europe, while the US revenue will forge 
ahead to € 498.3 million. This gap between U.S. and Western European 
online music revenue needs to be redressed.”21 And while the Commission 
left some room for the possibility of other factors contributing to this gap,22 
it mainly held the structure of existing collecting societies liable for 
Europe’s lower numbers. 
B. Collective Rights Management Societies in Europe 
¶13 “[M]ost . . . collective rights management societies currently derive 
their existence from rights granted or entrusted to them on a national 
(territorial) basis.”23 
                                                     
19 Id. at 4. 
20 See European Music Download Forecast: 2006 to 2011 by Rebecca 
Jennings—Forrester Research, 
http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,38733,00.html 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (stating the number of legal downloads via computer 
or mobile telephone is expected to grow 36% between 2006 and 2011). 
21 Working Document, supra note 9, at 6. 
22 See Working Document, supra note 9, at 6 n.6 (“Some argue that the principal 
hindrance to revenue growth in online music services is the widespread use of 
illegal peer-to-peer networks to share electronic music files, the lack of 
interoperability and consumer acceptance. Whilst these are contributory factors 
in each area, especially in the case [sic] P2P file sharing, efforts are being made 
separately either at a legislative level (Directive on Enforcement) or by market 
initiatives on greater interoperability.”).  
23 HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 22. 
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¶14 The somewhat fragmentary model according to which a cloud of 
collecting societies has been operating in the European Union does bring 
some benefits to both consumers and rights-holders. Hugenholtz’s study  
has identified at least two territoriality-related positive effects:24 cultural 
diversity and economic efficiency. Cultural diversity is a consequence of 
collecting societies naturally protecting and promoting local authors and 
performers.25 Economic efficiency happens – or may happen – because 
“[t]erritoriality makes it easier for right holders to define, and split up, 
markets along national borders, and set different prices and conditions for 
identical products or services in different Member States.”26 Nonetheless, 
there is a relevant drawback to this function: “such price discrimination” 
and “such uses of intellectual property are fundamentally at odds with the 
goal of achieving an internal market.”27  
¶15 Following the first steps taken in 2004 towards an assessment of the 
performance of the several collective rights management societies operating 
in the Union and the breadth of the online music licensing market, the 
European Commission chose to focus a large part of its analysis on an 
efficiency evaluation.  The Commission concluded that collecting societies 
across the Union present different levels of efficiency (see graphic below) 
and that, as a whole, they are prevented from addressing the geographic-free 
necessities of consumers and rights-holders by several factors, the primary 
one being  the territorial barriers to their expansion.28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 Id. at 23. 
25 Id. Interestingly, the European Commission will argue that the exact opposite 
model – promoting collecting societies with pan-European mandates – is 
actually the option that better suits cultural diversity, because it forces collecting 
societies to compete among themselves and competition will lead some of them 
to specialize in niche markets in order to survive. See Working Document, supra 
note 9, at 29. 
26 HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 23. 
27 Id. 
28 Working Document, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
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Collective right management societies are not equally efficient in the 
cross-border collection and distribution of revenues29 
 
¶16 Notice in particular the transversal negative growth rates in the 
revenues from affiliated societies.30 Although it stands alone on this trend, 
Spain’s SGAE also presents a strong decrease in the payments made to 
foreign societies (-13.12%), a phenomenon that is particularly interesting 
when linked to the fact that it has the highest growth in total revenues 
among Europe’s largest collecting societies.   
¶17 In addition to this irregular internal pattern, the Commission Staff 
found that the existence of collective rights management entities spread 
around Europe but operating on a mono-territorial basis was the source of 
considerable static and dynamic efficiency. “The current practice of 
collective management of copyright on a national territorial basis requires 
each collective rights manager to cooperate with others in the other 
territories, if a commercial user’s service is accessible in another territory. 
In practice, this means that a commercial user requires a license from each 
and every relevant collective rights manager in each territory of the EU in 
which the work is accessible.”31 
                                                     
29 Working Document, supra note 9, at 27 tbl.4.  
30 Affiliated societies are precisely the ones the Commission’s proposal will seek 
to eliminate, because of their “middle-man” quality. An affiliated society is the 
entity that enters into reciprocal agreements with foreign management societies 
when copyrighted works are available in other territories, thus being able to 
commercially exploit the foreign repertoire in its own territory.  See id. at 28. 
31 Working Document, supra note 9, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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¶18 This practice poses two problems: first, not all collective rights 
management societies have entered into bilateral representation agreements, 
which means that Europe has a pierced network and there is “no seamless 
system that covers the aggregate EU repertoire for any type of right or any 
form of exploitation;”32 and second, the cooperation between collecting 
societies is made through reciprocal representation agreements,33 the 
numbers of which can rise to astronomic levels if a collective rights 
manager wants to have Europe-wide coverage. The Commission Staff did 
its math and concluded that: 
In order for these reciprocal representation agreements to cover at 
least the aggregate repertoire of all European collective rights 
managers for one particular form of exploitation of one particular 
right (e.g. the public performance right used in a streaming 
services) in all European territories, by way of example, it is 
necessary that European collective rights managers conclude 
among themselves a minimum of 300 bilateral reciprocal 
representation agreements. This is based on the hypothesis that 
there would be a minimum of 25 collective rights managers per 
category of right on each Member State, each manager has to have 
a reciprocal representation agreement with the 24 other managers. 
In order to determine the total number of bilateral combinations 
necessary among 25 European collective rights manager, the 
number of combinations of k (=2) out of n (=25). This can be 
determined according to the following formula:34 
 
¶19 Given these practical constraints, most national collective rights 
management societies tend to enter into alliances that facilitate transnational 
                                                     
32 Id. at 9. 
33 The Commission Staff notes that “[t]he term ‘reciprocal’ in the context of 
these private agreements means ‘in return for of an identical grant.’ It does not 
connote ‘reciprocity’ for which there is a specific meaning in international law 
especially in the international copyright conventions i.e. where rights are granted 
by one country to its nationals, the nationals of another country can only have 
the benefit of those rights where there is commensurate recognition of these 
rights by the other country.” Id. n. 10. 
34 Id. at 8. A quick aside: something is deeply wrong when someone has to resort to 
a formula to figure out this number; a number that is per se frightening in a regional 
system whose primary economical goal is to establish and strengthen an internal 
market. 
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management of digital rights,35 but nonetheless present an important 
drawback.  The model agreements and the bilateral reciprocal representation 
agreements “concluded pursuant to . . . [these alliances] apply a series of 
restrictions which are contrary to the fundamental EU principle that 
services, including collective management of copyright or individual 
services associated with the collective management of copyright, should be 
provided across national borders without restriction based on nationality, 
residence, [or] place of establishment.”36 The consistency of these 
restrictions with the principles of European unfair trading law has not yet 
been analyzed by the European Court of Justice. However, in the case of 
Ministère Public v. Tournier,37 where the owners of a discotheque 
complained that SACEM was charging them an excessive fee, the court 
held that charging higher royalties in one State when compared to another 
was a violation of unfair trading law.38 Nevertheless, the court did say that 
such discrimination might be permissible under objective and relevant 
reasons.39 If the same reasoning was to apply to the bilateral reciprocal 
                                                     
35 See e.g., International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, 
http://www.cisac.org (follow “CISAC and Authors’ Rights” tab) (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2009); Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits 
d'Enregistrement et de Reproduction Mécanique, 
http://www.biem.org/content.aspx?PageId=122&CountryId=0&SocietyId=0 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2009); Societies' Council for the Collective Management 
of Performers' Rights, http://www.scapr.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).  
36 Working Document, supra note 9, at 9.  
37 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Aix-en-Provence, July 13, 1989, 
ECR 1989, 2521 (Fr.), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61987J0395:EN:HTML. 
38 See EC Treaty, supra note 3 at Art. 82 (“Any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, 
in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets 
or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, 
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.”). 
39 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Aix-en-Provence, July 13, 1989, 
ECR 1989, 2521, 46 (Fr.) (“Article 86 of the Treaty must be interpreted as 
meaning that a national copyright-management society holding a dominant 
position in a substantial part of the Common Market imposes unfair trading 
conditions where the royalties which it charges to discothèques are appreciably 
higher than those charged in other Member States, the rates being compared on a 
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agreements, this would be yet another case where competition rules are 
applied to rescue copyright holders, which is a frequent scenario in Europe. 
¶20 However, the Tournier case was decided in 1989, when the Internet 
had not yet acquired its instantaneous and global qualities. It is therefore 
arguable that today there will be much less “objective” or “relevant” 
grounds for restrictions that are territorial in nature.  
¶21 The Commission Staff has summarized the current panorama of 
transnational management of music-related rights in the following scheme, 
concluding that “the core service elements ‘cross-border grant of licenses to 
commercial users’ and ‘cross-border distribution of royalties’ do not 
function in an optimal manner and hamper the development of an 
innovative market for the provision of online music services.”40   
Overview of the potential cross-border services that are currently 
prevented by the structure of reciprocal agreements among collecting 
rights managers41 
 
                                                                                                                       
consistent basis. That would not be the case if the copyright-management 
society in question were able to justify such a difference by reference to 
objective and relevant dissimilarities between copyright management in the 
Member State concerned and copyright management in the other Member 
States.” (emphasis added)). 
40 Working Document, supra note 9, at 9. 
41 Id. at 29. 
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¶22 In the eyes of the Commission Staff, this rather complicated (and, 
above all, costly and time-consuming) scheme for cross-border licensing 
raises three major concerns: territorial restrictions to copyright licensing, 
discrimination in cross-border distribution of royalties and the existence of 
membership rules that may restrict cross-border provision of services.  
Summary of main problems with cross-border collective management 
of copyright for legitimate online music services42 
 
¶23 The Commission therefore sets a general goal to be achieved in the 
near future. This goal, in the Commission’s words, is “the opening up of 
Europe’s large and mainly unexploited potential growth in legitimate online 
services,” a desideratum that the Commission links to today’s lack of 
confidence of right-holders in the current cross-border management 
system.43 These goals would be backed up by changes at the so-called 
“specific” and “operational” levels, as the following chart illustrates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
42 Id. at 11. 
43 Id. at 31. 
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Summary of the problems and goals to be achieved44 
 
 
II. THE MAY 18, 2005 RECOMMENDATION: THE DESIGN 
¶24 The 2005 Commission Recommendation on Collective Cross-
Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online 
Music Services45 (hereinafter referred to as the Recommendation) is 
addressed to the Member States and “to all economic operators involved in 
the management of copyright and related rights within the Community.”46  
From its very beginning, the Recommendation shows, on the one hand, a 
                                                     
44 Id. at 32. 
45 Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Commission Recommendation of 18 May 
2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services, 2005/737/EC (May 18, 2005), available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_276/l_27620051021en00540057.pdf
[hereinafter Commission Recommendation]. 
46 Id. ¶ 19. 
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polarized concern with users and legal certainty, 47 and on the other, online 
music services’ business models, with rights-holders joining one of these 
two groups depending on the values or principles at stake. Its spirit is best 
embodied by recital 8, which states that: 
In the era of online exploitation of musical works . . . commercial 
users need a licensing policy that corresponds to the ubiquity of 
the online environment . . . . It is therefore appropriate to provide 
for multi-territorial licensing in order to enhance greater legal 
certainty to commercial users in relation to their activity and to 
foster the development of legitimate online services, increasing, 
in turn, the revenue stream for rights-holders.48 
¶25 Another goal of the Recommendation is to enhance the principle of 
freedom of choice, a principle that directly interferes with the traditional 
concepts of territoriality and even nationality. Recital 9 of the 
Recommendation states that: 
Freedom to provide collective management services across 
national borders entails that rights-holders are able to freely 
choose the collective rights manager for the management of the 
rights necessary to operate legitimate online music services across 
the Community. That right implies the possibility to entrust or 
transfer all or a part of the online rights to another collective 
rights manager irrespective of the Member State of residence or 
the nationality of either the collective rights manager or the 
rights-holder.49 
¶26 The picture becomes more interesting when we tie these principles 
to those of equitable remuneration and nondiscrimination, a liaison 
performed by recital 12, which adds “category of rights-holder” to residence 
and nationality as forbidden grounds for discrimination.50 This view is 
furthered by recital 13, which underlines that “[t]here should be no 
difference in treatment on the basis of category of membership in the 
collective rights management society: all rights-holders, be they authors, 
composers, publishers, record producers, performers or others, should be 
                                                     
47 See generally id. (characterizing “users” as “commercial users”). 
48 Id. at recital 8. 
49 Id. at recital 9 (emphasis added). 
50 Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, at recital 12 (“Royalties 
collected on behalf of right holders should be distributed equitably and without 
discrimination on the grounds of residence, nationality, or category of rights-
holder. In particular, royalties collected in behalf of rights-holders in Member 
States other than those in which the rights-holders are resident or of which they 
are nationals should be distributed as effectively and efficiently as possible.”). 
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treated equally.”51 Residence and nationality also reappear at the level of 
the relationship between the collecting society and its member, with recital 
11 stating that “[t]here should be no difference in treatment of rights-
holders by rights managers on the basis of Member State of residence or 
nationality.”52 Paragraph 9 will fully embody the principle of 
nondiscrimination, as applied to the granting of licenses to commercial 
users.53  
¶27 Other principles stressed by the Recommendation are 
rationalization and transparency in the relationship between the different 
structures involved in cross-border management of rights.54 The concept of 
rationalization seems to be connected with the notions of efficiency and 
effectiveness.55 Unfortunately, the actual recommendations made by the 
Commission in the paragraphs to follow are too broad in scope to offer a 
substantive view of what steps rationalization may require collecting 
societies to take. Regarding transparency, however, Paragraph 14, which is 
dedicated to accountability, states that, “[c]ollective rights managers should 
report regularly to all right-holders they represent, whether directly or under 
reciprocal representation agreements, on any licenses granted, applicable 
tariffs and royalties collected and distributed.”56 
¶28 Both transparency and rationalization requirements are connected 
with the Commission’s concerns with users: recital 13 explicitly articulates 
                                                     
51 Id. at recital 13 (“Additional recommendations on accountability, rightholder 
representation in the decision-making bodies of collective rights managers and 
dispute resolution should ensure that collective rights managers achieve a higher 
level of rationalisation and transparency and that rightholders and commercial 
users can make informed choices. There should be no difference in treatment on 
the basis of category of membership in the collective rights management 
society: all right-holders, be they authors, composers, publishers, record 
producers, performers or others, should be treated equally.”). 
52 Id. at recital 10 (“The relationship between right-holders and collective rights 
managers, whether based on contract or statutory membership rules, should 
include a minimum protection for right-holders with respect to all categories of 
rights that are necessary for the provision of legitimate online music services. 
There should be no difference in treatment of right-holders by rights managers 
on the basis of the Member State of residence or nationality.”). 
53 Id. ¶ 9 (“Collective rights managers should grant commercial users licenses on 
the basis of objective criteria and without any discrimination among users.” 
(emphasis added)). 
54 See id. at recital 10 (“Fostering effective structures for cross-border 
management of rights should also ensure that collective rights management 
achieve a higher level of rationalisation and transparency, with regard to 
compliance with competition rules . . . .”). 
55 Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, at recital 12. 
56 Id. ¶ 14. 
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the relationship between those two principles and the ability of commercial 
users, as well as rights-holders, to make “informed choices.”57  
¶29 Finally, paragraph 4 will add the principle of diligence to the ones 
listed in the introductory recitals. 58  
¶30 If one stopped reading the Recommendation at the end of the 
recitals, the most important trends characterizing the path that the 
Commission has chosen to follow would already be recognizable: after 
acknowledging the constraints placed on the online music market by a 
strong territorial approach and detrimental effects of such an approach on 
users (burdened by legal uncertainty and a country–to–country based access 
to music), copyright holders (bound to rigid licensing schemes that are 
likely to diminish their revenues) and collecting societies (prevented from 
having wider, more efficient, regional business models), the Commission 
relies heavily on the principle of nondiscrimination (which will materialize 
in paragraph 13) as a means of counterbalancing the loss of territoriality that 
a pan-European, or even a multinational licensing scheme, would imply. 
Attached to nondiscrimination, there is a set of other principles aimed at 
promoting a more expeditious and robust licensing process: transparency, 
efficiency, and equitable remuneration, whose ultimate practical effect is to 
empower copyright holders. From an economical point of view, copyright 
holders are the ones who arguably have more to gain from a multi-territorial 
licensing scheme and, consentaneously with this perspective, the 
Commission spends much of its time focusing on ways to strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis the collecting societies.59 
A. The Online Music Market 
¶31 One problem with the content of this Recommendation is that some 
of its definitions – and roughly a quarter of its length is spent on definitions 
– are tautological. Consider, for instance, paragraph 1 (d): “multi-territorial 
license means a license which covers the territory of more than one Member 
state).”60  
¶32 Other definitions are far more helpful, such as the one contained in 
paragraph 1 (a), which specifies that for the purposes of this 
                                                     
57 Id. at recital 13 (“Additional recommendations on accountability, rights-
holder representation in the decision-making bodies of collective rights 
managers and dispute resolution should ensure that collective rights managers 
achieve a higher level of rationalisation and transparency and that rights-holders 
and commercial users can make informed choices . . . .”). 
58 Id. ¶ 4 (“Collective rights managers should apply the utmost diligence in 
representing the interests of rights-holders.”). 
59 See id. ¶ 3. 
60 Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, ¶ 1(d). 
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Recommendation, “management of copyright and related rights” includes 
“the grant of licenses to commercial users, the auditing and monitoring of 
rights, the enforcement of copyright and related rights, the collection of 
royalties and the distribution of royalties to right-holders.” 61  
¶33 The most interesting part of the Recommendation is probably the 
introduction of a definition of online rights,62 which are split into three 
categories: 
 The exclusive right of reproduction of intangible copies made in 
the process of online distribution of musical works.63  
 The right of communication to the public of a musical work either 
in the form of a right to authorize or a right to prohibit pursuant to 
Directive 2001/29/EC,64 or a right to equitable remuneration 
pursuant to Directive 92/100/EEC65 – and here the 
Recommendation specifies that these rights apply to webcasting, 
internet radio and simulcasting,66 or “near-on-demand services 
received either on a personal computer or on a mobile telephone.”67 
 The exclusive right of making available a musical work pursuant to 
Directive 2001/29/EC – including on-demand and other interactive 
services.68  
¶34 Paragraph 5 addresses the relationship between rights-holders and 
collective rights managers in the online licensing environment. It is a 
                                                     
61 Id. ¶ 1(a), (h) (“[A] ‘commercial user’ means any person involved in the 
provision of online music services who needs a license from rights-holders in 
order to provide legitimate online music services . . . .”). 
62 Id. ¶ 1(f). 
63 Id. ¶ 1(f)(i). 
64 Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001/29/EC (May 22, 
2001), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_167/l_16720010622en00100019.pdf. 
65 Council of the European Cmtys., Council Directive of 19 November 1992 on 
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property, 92/100/EEC (November 19, 1992), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/docs/1992-100_en.pdf. 
66 Working Document, supra note 9, at 7 n.1 (“A simulcast is a ‘simultaneous 
broadcast,’ and refers to programs or events broadcast across more than one 
medium at the same time. Streaming allows data to be transferred in a stream of 
packets that are interpreted as they arrive for ‘just-in-time’ delivery of 
multimedia information. A webcast is similar to a broadcast television program 
but designed for internet transmission.”). 
67 Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 1(f)(ii). 
68 Id. ¶ 1(f)(iii). 
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provision crafted with the intent of giving rights-holders the maximum 
autonomy and freedom of choice.69 It establishes a set of minimum criteria 
that should govern the relationship between rights-holders and collective 
rights managers: rights-holders have the ability to determine the online 
rights that they want to entrust for collective management; the ability to 
“determine the territorial scope of the mandate of the collective rights 
managers;”70 and the right to withdraw any of the rights that they have 
entrusted to a particular manager,71 and “transfer the multi-territorial 
management of those rights to another . . . manager, irrespective of the 
Member State of residence or the nationality of either the . . . manager or 
the right-holder.”72  
¶35 Paragraph 6 places upon the collective rights manager the 
correlative duty of informing “right-holders and commercial users of the 
repertoire they represent, any existing reciprocal representation agreements, 
the territorial scope of their mandates for that repertoire and the applicable 
tariffs.”73 
¶36 The principle of equitable remuneration materializes in paragraph 
10,74 coupled with the provisions on deductions, both reflecting the 
Commission’s concerns with transparency and information; in this sense, 
paragraph 11 requires that: 
Contracts and statutory membership rules governing the 
relationship between collective rights managers and right-holders 
for the management, at Community level, of musical works for 
online use should specify whether and to what extent, there will be 
deductions for purposes other than for the management of the 
services provided.75  
¶37 Information and transparency will play a crucial role in the 
successful development of any kind of multi-territorial music license that 
Europe may come to implement, since most of the non-legal obstacles to the 
expansion of collecting societies – even of the ones that operate at a 
                                                     
69 See id. ¶ 5(a). 
70 Id. ¶ 5(b). 
71 Id. ¶ 5(c) (noting that rights-holders have to give “reasonable notice of their 
intention” to withdraw.).  
72 In cases of transference of management, paragraph 5(d) imposes that, 
“without prejudice to other forms of cooperation among rights managers,” all 
online rights have also to be withdrawn from “any existing reciprocal 
representation agreement concluded amongst them.” Id. ¶ 5(d). 
73 Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 6. 
74 “Collective rights managers should distribute royalties to all rights-holders or 
category of rights-holders they represent in an equitable manner.” Id. ¶ 10. 
75 Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Paragraph 12 further specifies that this information 
is to be provided “[u]pon payment of royalties.” Id. ¶ 12. 
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national circumscribed level – is precisely the mistrust felt and expressed by 
a large number of rights-holders (particularly the small and medium sized 
ones).76 
¶38 At least in theory, this scheme should give rights-holders a greater 
ability to control and exploit their online rights, while at the same time solve 
some of the mistrust issues that have undermined their relationship with 
collecting societies. As mentioned above,77 paragraph 14 also plays an 
important role in establishing accountability rules that ensure that collective 
rights managers will provide information on a regular basis about the 
applicable tariffs and the royalties that have been collected.78  
                                                     
76 Tilman Lueder, Head of the Copyright Unit – DG Internal Market and 
Services, made some interesting remarks on this topic:  
This is an especially thorny area. Collective management has not 
always [been] seen as a “fair deal” by artists and rights-holders, 
particularly those who don’t live in countries where royalties are 
collected on their behalf. For example, a pending complaint alleges 
that the Scottish actor Sean Connery has never received € 95.963 
from the French collective rights management society ADAMI 
because ADAMI states that it does not have Mr. Connery’s address.   
. . . .  
 
Transparency is important because foreign authors and other holders 
of copyright don’t always know how proceeds from their royalties are 
being spent. In some cases, domestic collecting societies take a cut of 
royalties to support cultural initiatives or even retirement funds. 
These initiatives are often undertaken for the sole benefit of domestic 
rights-holders. We are thinking about an obligation that requires 
collective rights management societies to indicate clearly the 
deductions they make before distributing royalties for activities such 
as pension funds and cultural promotion. National borders are clearly 
also an issue in this area. Content providers such as publishing houses 
and music companies increasingly see the national management of 
copyright as an impediment to the rollout of trans-border online 
services. We need to introduce clear rules on the terms and tariffs that 
online service providers have to pay for copyright licenses. Service 
providers must be able to contest tariffs – particularly in cases where 
the tariffs are so high that it makes it hard to launch or operate web-
based delivery models.   
Tilman Lueder, Speech at the 13th Annual Conference on International 
Intellectual Property Law & Policy: Legislative and Policy Developments in the 
European Union (2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/docs/fordham2005_en.pdf. 
77 See ¶ 27 supra.  
78 See Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 14. 
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¶39 The Recommendation finishes with the follow-up provisions, 
inviting both Member States and collective rights managers to report on a 
yearly basis to the Commission on “the measures they have taken in relation 
to” the Recommendation and “on the management, at Community level, of 
copyright and related rights for the provision of legitimate online music 
services.”79 The Commission also assures the Member States that it will 
monitor “on a continuous basis” the development “of the online music 
sector in the light of this Recommendation” and evaluate the need “for 
further action at Community level.”80 
¶40 It took the Parliament almost two years to answer back to the 
Commission. In the meantime, the Commission itself released a Working 
Document that is essentially an ex post explanation of the ex ante 
Recommendation economic assessment of possible solutions regarding 
transnational management of rights. 81 There were, of course, reactions from 
the music, broadcasting, and cultural industries in general, but not a single 
Member State took any step forward with respect to this issue.82 Eventually, 
the first move belonged to the collecting societies themselves.83 The legal 
landscape, nevertheless, remained still. 
B. A Preliminary Assessment 
¶41 The most disappointing aspect of this Recommendation is its 
nature. If the European Commission was convinced that this was indeed the 
way for Europe to move forward, it is frustrating to see what could have 
been a quasi-revolutionary act turn into an act that appears together with 
other acts “with no binding force.”84 Given the size and potentialities of the 
European online music market and all its ramifications, a stronger approach 
to the problem was absolutely needed. 2005 was the time to seize the 
opportunity – to catch the train while it was still leaving the station.  
Perhaps the Recommendation’s form was chosen instead of any other 
binding instrument due to understandable doubts about the overall 
suitability of this approach in a mosaic like Europe. Additionally, had the 
Commission been bold enough, it could have even been more farsighted and 
ventured to touch other copyright-related domains, such as broadcasting. 
This field is particularly interesting because it is surrounded by great legal 
uncertainty. The Internet has lead to the dissemination of copyrighted works 
under a hybrid form; works that are downloaded via on-demand services but 
                                                     
79 See id. ¶¶ 16–18. 
80 See id. ¶ 18. 
81 See Working Document, supra note 9. 
82 If anything, there was only a big disappointment, see id. at 36 (explaining the 
continued legal uncertainty from failure to act). 
83  See id. at 36–37. 
84 See EC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 249.  
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also share the characteristics of broadcasting. Europe, however, does  not 
have a provision regulating this potential overlap. When it comes to music, 
it would have been particularly helpful to have some sort of guidance on 
whether these cases fall within the “making available” right,85 or whether 
they are left for broadcast regulation to address. 
¶42 Clearly, the Commission is not misunderstanding the nature of the 
problem – and the proof is this very Recommendation, which accurately 
diagnoses it: 
Licensing of online rights is often restricted by territory, and 
commercial users negotiate in each Member State with each of 
the respective collective rights managers for each right that is 
included in the online exploitation.86 
¶43 There are too many ‘eaches’ in the equation. But while it grasps the 
smaller problem, the Commission seems unable to see the bigger picture: 
that a binding act is needed and that the boundaries of music dissemination 
via the Internet might not be as clear as one might initially think. Still, this 
is a shift from the traditional “upwards” harmonizing tendency that the 
Community has been so fond of where Intellectual Property is concerned. If 
Hugenholtz in correct in stating that the European Institutions keep aiming 
at the wrong target,87 this time the Commission seems to have pointed at the 
right one, although we are still waiting for it to fire the first shot. 
 C.  The Commission Staff Working Document and Other Options 
¶44 The 2005 Recommendation is the final product of the 
Commission’s investment in the protection of a fairly new but nonetheless 
solid grounded market: the online music licensing business. Prior to its 
enactment, the Commission sought to evaluate the status of that market 
through a series of studies,88 having found that the current European 
business model was a source of inefficiency.89 The Recommendation thus 
arose as an answer to the constraints that territoriality placed upon market 
fluidity, the legal uncertainty that surrounded the emergent urge to license, 
and the lack of transparency in the relationship between rights-holders and 
collective rights managers. 
 
                                                     
85 See Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, at recital 5. 
86 Id. at recital 7 (emphasis added). 
87 HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5. 
88 Id.  
89 See id. at 22 (detailing the fragmented, inconsistent, and static nature of 
existing Directives). 
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¶45 However, besides other strategic options such as initiating the 
process for the enactment of a binding act regulating cross-border music 
licensing, the Commission did have other substantive choices that it could 
have pursued. It is important to address those other solutions the 
Commission at some point envisioned, eventually dismissed, but came to 
light in July of the same year. 
¶46 The Commission Staff Working Document presents three 
approaches to cross-border management of rights under a section entitled 
“Policy Options,” 90 described as being the following: 
 Do nothing91 
 Eliminate territorial restrictions and discriminatory provisions in 
the reciprocal representation agreements concluded between 
collective rights managers92 
 Give rights-holders the choice to authorize collecting societies of 
their choice to online rights for the entire European Union93 
 
¶47 It is odd – and it is certainly not a very good sign – to see a “do 
nothing” solution even considered after the findings of major inefficiencies 
in the copyright licensing system.94 This puzzling part of the Commission 
Staff Working Document was obviously one of the main targets of criticism 
of the several reactions that followed its publication.95 The conclusion 
under this so-called policy option is that there would probably be a limited 
form of multi-territorial license, anyway, but “there would be no choice as 
to the collective rights manager who would provide this license.”96 
According to the Commission Staff, “this would mean that multi-territorial 
licenses could only be given for online exploitation and by the collective 
rights manager in the territory where the licensee has its ‘economic 
                                                     
90 See Working Document, supra note 9, at 33-34. 
t 33. 
internal and external 
t_1
91 Id. a
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 34. 
94 This line of reasoning is matched throughout the Working Document by 
charming statements such as, “Doing nothing will have no impact outside the 
EU.” Id. at 43.  The Working Document also discusses the 
effects of each one of the three options. See id. at 34–57.  
95 See, e.g., Position Paper, European Broad. Union, Initial EBU Comments on 
Commission Staff Working Document: Study on a Community Initiative on the 
Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright (Aug. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg_pp_crossborder_collectivemanagmen
90805_tcm6-40156.pdf (“Option 1 (do nothing) is indeed not acceptable”). 
Working Document, supra note 9, at 34. 96 See 
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residence.’”97 It is very basic logic, but at least the Working Document 
succeeds in realizing that this consequence would constitute “an undue 
hindrance to the provision of a cross-border commercial rights management 
service to users resid 98ent in other territories.”  
                                                     
¶48 The second approach – elimination of territorial restrictions and 
discriminatory provisions in the reciprocal representation agreements – was 
described in the Working Document as a solution that would “introduce a 
single entry point and choice for commercial end users but it would not 
introduce increased choice as to collective rights manager at the level of for 
right-holders.”99 This approach would improve the collection of royalties 
and their administration by the management society, at the same time that it 
would banish “customer allocation clauses.”100  However, it would not 
completely eliminate the limitations on rights-holders’ freedom to choose a 
rights manager in a different territory and entrusting it with a pan-European 
management of his rights. The Working Document concludes that, if this is 
the path chosen, collective rights managers have no scope “to improve their 
services or differentiate their repertoires by actively competing for the 
business of right-holders.”101 The only benefit of this approach appears to 
be, in the Commission Staff’s view, with respect to licensing, that this 
solution would “ensure . . . the territorial restrictions in classical reciprocity 
agreements that hinder the affiliate society from licensing the management 
society’s repertoire beyond its own home territory” would be “removed 
from all reciprocal representation agreements.”102 But then again, it “will 
not resolve the issue that most CRMs are entirely dependent on reciprocal 
agreements in order to offer their repertoire.”103 Moreover, “[t]his leads to a 
situation where almost no CRM has an attractive repertoire of its own, but 
all of them, by virtue of a network of reciprocity, offer an identical 
repertoire to commercial users.”104 
¶49 The third option – allowing rights-holders to choose a particular 
collecting society to manage their online rights for all of Europe – was the 
approach chosen by the Recommendation. The Working Paper points out 
the advantages of such a solution: 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. Current reciprocal representation agreements restrict the affiliated 
societies’ ability to grant multi-territorial licenses to content providers whose 
economic residence is located in its “home” territory – these are the so-called 
“consumer allocation clauses.” Id. 
101 See id. 
102 Working Document, supra note 9, at 34. 
103 Id. at 34–35.  
104 Id. at 35. 
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 it cuts off the intermediary (the affiliate society), which is directly 
replaced by direct membership in a collective rights management 
society of the choice of the copyright owner.105  
 in return, the inexistence of these intermediary societies, which as 
the holders of foreign repertoire “can limit the territorial authority 
of the licensor to clear the rights in its home territory only,” opens 
up the possibility of having a European-wide management of 
rights.106 
 direct membership also eliminates the deductions that reciprocal 
agreements always imply, thus increasing the rights-holders 
revenues.107 
 a market that is no longer shaped by territory not only increases the 
rights-holder choices and stimulates copyright management 
services to compete, but also forces some of these services to 
differentiate themselves “by offering different elements of the 
management services they provide for right-holders.”108  
 generalized cross-border licensing will also lead to the formation of 
niche licensing markets,109 which ultimately could be said to 
promote cultural diversity. 
                                                     
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 The Working Paper suggests that this effect would favor “big rights-holders,” 
the ones “whose work is exploited on a large scale across the EU.” See id. at 35–
36. But it is arguable that this will favor big, medium, and small rights-holders 
as well—the bigger ones because of the reduction in transaction costs, and the 
medium- and small-sized ones because they will proportionally benefit from the 
elimination of the reciprocal agreement deductions and they will now have the 
chance to have their music licensed in a much broader, quasi-non-territorial 
market. 
108 Working Document, supra note 9, at 35. These services would consist in 
differentiation “in terms of, e.g., the method applied in monitoring use made of 
works (detailed monitoring of all occasions where works are used as opposed to 
surveys).” Id. Other examples are “the speed in which royalties are remitted to 
right-holders or the level of detail in which a right-holder is informed of the 
different uses made of his protected works.” Id. According to the Commission 
Staff’s reasoning, these would be the appealing factors to small rights-holders. 
Id.  
109 In the words of the Commission Staff:  
The increasing diversity of online music services will create a 
demand for cross-border genre-specific licenses. . . . This 
development would increase efficiency thereby making [collective 
rights managers] more attractive to right-holders and commercial 
users alike. For a series of customer groups with a specific demand, 
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¶50 A comparison between Policy Options 2 and 3 shows that: 
 at the level of competition, “[i]n Option 3, [collecting societies] 
would have to compete among themselves to attract right-holders, 
while in Option 2 [collecting societies] would compete to attract 
the business of commercial users. Option 3 can therefore be 
referred to as the ‘right-holders option’ while option 2 is more 
favourable to commercial users.”110 However, the competition 
fostered by Option 2 leaves “in place the membership limitations 
contained in the underlying reciprocal arrangements,” which are a 
source of “static” service,111 freezing competition between 
collecting societies, whereas Option 3, “by giving right-holders the 
possibility to freely choose and move among [collective rights 
managers], would create the competitive discipline that forces 
[collecting societies] to compete among themselves for right-
holders and negotiate advantageous royalties on their behalf. If 
their services were either inefficient or too expensive, right-holders 
would move to another rights manager. This level of competitive 
threat would counteract any tendency toward monopoly at the 
Community level.”112 
                                                                                                                       
Option 3 presents an alternative for the standardized and uniform 
service currently offered under the reciprocal agreements.  
Id. at 36. 
110 Id. at 40. 
111 Id. at 41. This would happen because: 
Removing the territorial restriction and customer allocation clauses 
would give all 25 potential entry points the unlimited ability to grant 
multi-repertoire licenses that, in addition, covers all 25 national 
territories; [t]here would be no variation as to the multi-repertoire 
and multi-territory service offered by the 25 competing [collecting 
societies]. Indeed, all the elements of the underlying rights 
management service remain static. This is because right-holders, 
under the current system of reciprocity, must remain members of 
their respective management societies and these management 
societies, in turn, would remain ‘locked-in’ into the network of 
reciprocal agreements; . . . In these circumstances, this static network 
of reciprocal agreements will, in due course, confer monopoly power 
onto the affiliate societies’ that commercial users have initially 
chosen as their single access point and freeze competition at that 
level. In addition, once the affiliate societies and their commercial 
users have an established course of dealing by putting in place 
mutually interoperable electronic monitoring and payment systems, 
there is the additional risk of ‘lock-in’ at the commercial users’ 
level.”  
Id.  
112 Id.  
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 at the level of trade flows, Option 2 would eliminate the two forms 
of territorial restrictions that govern the current reciprocal 
arrangements: “it would extend the affiliate society’s authority to 
license the management society’s repertoire beyond its home 
territory and thus grant a license that also covers the management 
society’s territory,”113 and allow the affiliate society to “grant 
licenses also to commercial users whose economic residence it not 
within their home territory. Eliminating these forms of territorial 
restrictions will foster cross-border trade in collective online rights 
management in the Community.”114 To the eyes of the Commission 
Staff, Option 3 would maximize these effects because “trade flows 
will no longer depend on the proper functioning of reciprocal 
representation agreements but on the direct relationship between 
right-holders and the [collective rights management societies] of 
their choice.”115 
 at the level of innovation and growth, “Option 2 would stimulate 
the roll-out of new online services because the requisite 
Community-wide license would be available at a single access 
point to be freely chosen by the commercial user.”116 The problem 
with this approach is that “obtaining the multi-repertoire and multi-
territorial license at a single entry point by enhancing the network 
of reciprocal representation agreements among [collective rights 
management societies] would be costly and detrimental to right-
holders. Given that royalties are channeled via both the affiliate and 
the management society, the cost of maintaining the web of 
reciprocity would be burdensome and corresponding deductions 
would be made by both the affiliate and the management society, 
before the right-holders are paid.”117 Option 3, on the other hand, 
would create a single entry point for “all European repertoire for  
all European territories because the European repertoire will be 
split among a small number of [collecting societies].”118  
 at the level of prices, the Working Paper indicates that “Option 2 
would most likely achieve little in terms of pricing pressure on 
licenses taken out by commercial users. This is because these 
                                                     
113 Working Document, supra note 9, at 39. 
114Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 40. 
117 Id. 
118 Working Document, supra note 9, at 40.  Notice, however, that it would 
maximize the incentive to create because “rights-holders receive royalties from 
their collective rights manager of choice in line with actual use made of their 
works.” (emphasis added). See id.  
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licenses will be governed by the tariffs applicable in the country 
where the copy-right protected work is accessible to the end 
consumer and possible competition with respect to administrative 
cost is a small part of a multi-repertoire and multi-territorial 
license.”119 On the other hand, Option 3, by creating new 
opportunities for services and enhancing consumer choice, “would 
allow for premium content to be priced higher because it gives the 
collective rights manager who has attracted such content a very 
strong bargaining position vis-à-vis commercial users.”120 
 The Commission Staff also considered that both Options 2 and 3 
would potentially promote culture and foster creativity, since they 
“increase the overall amount of revenues created by copyright 
licensing in the online environment and thus ‘enlarge the pie’ to be 
distributed to all right-holders across the EU,”121 but provided no 
convincing evidence linking the increase in revenues with the 
investment in culture; instead it followed a rather frail and 
speculative line of reasoning: “[Collective rights managers] may 
therefore engage in (1) a diversified sponsorship policy across more 
than one Member State showcasing domestic talent; (2) finding 
new audiences for various sectors of creation, notably in difficult 
fields like contemporary music as opposed to limiting it to national 
audiences only (3) cultural events featuring domestic content with 
an international platform; (5) financial support for musical and 
audiovisual productions on a national and international level.”122 It 
may have a valid point, though, when it states that “[b]etter cross-
border licensing would make available a larger variety of cross-
border programming for the various language and cultural 
communities across Europe, wherever they reside.”123 
¶51 The Working Paper takes some other prongs in consideration while 
comparatively reviewing Options 2 and 3, but some of them do not rise 
above the level of mere theoretical speculation, totally lacking supporting 
evidence.124 The overall assessment points clearly to a prevalence of Option 
                                                     
119 Id. at 43. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 38. 
122 Id.  
123 Working Document, supra note 9, at 38. 
124 Id. at 43.  Consider, for instance, the analysis of the level of the impact that 
the implementation of one of these systems would have outside the European 
Union: the Paper’s only assertion is that “[i]ntroducing enhanced royalty flow 
across national borders and introducing better multiterritorial licensing might 
lead to rights-holders from third countries, especially under Option 3, electing to 
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3’s benefits over those offered by Option 2, a view that is consentaneous 
with the philosophy adopted by the Recommendation. The question now is: 
did the Commission Staff take the best approach to the problem? And, 
whether the previous question is answered in the affirmative or not, does the 
Recommendation succeed in promoting the goals the Commission is 
seeking to enforce? 
¶52 Regarding the first question, the Commission Staff did perform an 
overall coherent analysis, although it relied on a major assumption that 
competition is the natural answer to the static and dynamic inefficiencies 
observed in the modus operandi of Europe’s collective rights management 
societies.125  A different view, supported by authors like Towse and 
Handke, suggests that these societies are actually monopolies or narrow 
oligopolies and that competition may well produce the opposite effect, an 
undesired increase in licensing costs.126 
¶53 Towse and Handke’s study offers a very interesting analysis of the 
economics of copyright licensing and points out that Europe’s recent 
copyright policy (especially where cross-border management of rights is 
concerned) has been much closer to the Anglo-American tradition than to 
the continental droit d’auteur approach.127 “[T]he predominance of 
economic objectives is not only a question of the preferences of current 
[European Union] decision-makers but it is built into the very legal 
structure of the [European Union].”128 
¶54 The authors’ inference that the measures proposed by the 
Commission are unlikely to improve the transnational music licensing 
scheme in Europe’s collecting societies is rooted in the idea that the Internet 
and technology, especially digital rights management, are incapable of 
contradicting the tendency of economies of scale to reinstate monopolies.129 
                                                                                                                       
have their rights managed by EU based collective rights management societies.” 
Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
125 See id. at 40–41. 
126 See Ruth Towse & Christian Handke, Regulating Copyright Collecting 
Societies: Current Policy in Europe, 2007 SOC’Y FOR ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT 
ISSUES 1, available at http://www2.hu-
berlin.de/gbz/downloads/pdf/SERCIACPapers/towsehandke.pdf. 
127 Id. at 2 (noting that this is less a voluntary choice of the policy makers than a 
consequence of the legal architecture of the Union; “Article 151 of the Treaty, 
introduced with the Maastricht revision in 1991, requires the European 
Community to take cultural aspects into account in its actions but not to develop 
a cultural policy per se”).  
128 Id. at 2. 
129 Id. at 10 (providing a particular view of the nature and role of collective 
rights management societies: not only do the authors believe that these societies 
are natural monopolies, but they also picture them as some sort of “common 
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They align with the economists that claim that “a natural monopoly is best 
left intact but unregulated,”130 a view that, in the present case, clashes with 
the Commission’s position on the advantages of robust competition. As the 
authors put it, “whether the existence of a single supplier of collective rights 
management services for a particular bundle of rights is beneficial for 
society at large depends on the extent to which [collecting societies] exploit 
their monopoly position to raise prices or to tolerate inefficiencies within 
their organization or how successfully they can be regulated.”131 The 
Commission would therefore have misevaluated the size of the European 
market; in markets as large as Japan and the United States, “there is no 
effective competition between collective rights management societies,”132 a 
phenomenon that the authors link to the high fixed costs of entry. The 
consequences of promoting competition within the European Union could 
therefore lead to the appearance of a limited number of new collecting 
societies, but nevertheless “mergers would soon take place to benefit from 
economies of scale and network effects . . . and natural monopoly would 
reassert itself.”133 
¶55 Treating collecting societies as monopolies or oligopolies is a 
position that also takes issue with the Commission’s argument that 
competition promotes innovation because it enables users to shop around 
for the society that best represents their interests. However, Towse and 
Handke argue that, even if this was true, it would lead to a “tragedy of the 
anti-commons,” in the sense that “excessive debundling of rights . . . would 
vastly increase search and other transaction costs for users.”134 The 
Commission’s option for forcing collecting societies to operate at a 
Community-wide level would therefore be a “traditional” competition law 
approach that “ignores several important features of collecting societies.”135 
This fact leads the Authors to conclude that “[i]t is hard to see how the 
Commission can achieve its aims without changing copyright law. It could 
even be argued that the root of the problem lies with copyright law itself, 
which by proliferating rights has created the need for an ever more complex 
                                                                                                                       
carriers” in the sense that they “are required to admit all eligible right-holders as 
members” or alternatively as “social insurance” societies, because “they operate 
similarly to an insurer that is regulated in order to provide an essential service 
for everyone in the market it serves, analogously, for example, to a private 
health insurer that is prevented from excluding high risk categories from its 
insurance”).  
130 Towse & Handke, supra note 124, at 11 (attributing this principle to William 
Baumol). 
131 Id. at 11. 
132 Id. at 12. 
133 Id. 
134 Id at 13. 
135 Towse & Handke, supra note 124, at 14–15. 
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system of [collective rights management] societies to make it workable.”136 
This is another aspect of the paradox addressed by Hugenholtz, because 
“[w]ithout [collective rights management societies], the majority of creators 
and other right-holders would not be able to enjoy the benefits of copyright 
law, thus defeating its purpose. [Collecting societies] are the spontaneous 
private solution to government failure in the enforcement of copyright law; 
however, when they collaborated in order to facilitate online rights licensing 
it was dubbed collusive.”137  
 D.  Monitoring Process by the European Commission 
¶56 On January 17, 2007, the Commission called for comments that 
received eighty-nine replies from a wide variety of stakeholders.138 After 
this monitoring process, the Commission concluded that there was a nascent 
market for EU-wide licensing of music for online services (it seems at least 
odd that four years after the Commission started its work, the market is still 
considered to be nascent) and that the Recommendation seems to have 
produced some impact. This fact would mean that no further measures 
would be needed, not even the repetition of the monitoring process, which 
would only take place “should a clear need to do so arise.”139 
¶57 In a very short report of seven pages, the Commission summarized 
the replies received from the stakeholders, which are grouped in four 
categories: collecting societies, with almost half of the replies, (music) 
publishers, users (mostly broadcasters) and Member States (it is mentioned 
that eight Member States replied, although on the list of published replies 
one can only find six: France, Cyprus, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and the UK).140 
¶58 The call for comments was structured around several issues. The 
first question was whether it was necessary to have binding rules on a 
variety of topics such as licensing, transparency and governance, 
assignment and withdrawal of online rights. While most collecting societies 
and publishers were not inclined to binding rules, users took the opposite 
                                                     
136 Id at 15. 
137 Id.  
138 Non-confidential contributions are made available on the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/management_en.htm
#contributions. 
139 See Monitoring of the 2005 Music Online Recommendation [hereinafter 
Monitoring the Recommendation], at 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/monitoring-
report_en.pdf. 
140 See id. at 3.  
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view and Member States showed concern that the non-legislative approach 
“circumvent[ed] the democratic process.”141 
¶59 As far as E.U.-wide-licensing is concerned, the ultimate goal of the 
Commission’s recommendation, the monitoring processes acknowledged 
several initiatives that were announced or formed (Alliance Digital, 
ARMONIA, CELAS, PEDL, SACEM-UMPG, etc.).142 Nevertheless, at the 
time of the adoption of the monitoring report, only one E.U.-wide license 
had been granted (CELAS with the mobile operator Omniforne covering the 
MusicStation download service for the EMI repertoire).143 
¶60 The monitoring report also listed the obstacles for EU-wide 
licensing as reported by the stakeholders, ongoing litigation among 
collecting societies, withholding taxes and identification of works, as well 
as the stakeholders’ responses to the question of whether the 
Recommendation correctly set out the online rights.144 Users seemed to be 
satisfied with the level of delineation or fragmentation of rights operated by 
the Recommendation, while collecting societies claimed that they were not 
properly defined.145  
¶61 Finally, with regard to governance and transparency, collecting 
societies failed to see any problems surrounding this issue and mentioned a 
“Common Declaration” between ICMP/CIEM and GESAC that would 
contain harmonized minimum standards that were considered good 
practices.146 The report also stated that users did not voice strong feelings 
about transparency and governance per se.147 
¶62 If one thing has become clear after this monitoring report, it is that, 
at least for the time being, contrary to the views expressed by the European 
Parliament, which are summarized below, the European Commission seems 
to have lost the appetite for legislation in this area. Although it is fair to say 
the recommendation triggered some interesting movements among 
collecting societies, it is difficult to argue that it has achieved the objectives 
that the documents issued back in 2004 and 2005 considered necessary for 
the good functioning of an internal market in online music services. 
Therefore, it appears it would have been easy for the Commission to 
recommend the adoption of a binding instrument.     
 
                                                     
141 See id. at 4. 
142 See id. at 5–7. 
143 See id. at 6. 
144 See Monitoring the Recommendation, supra note 142, at 7. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 8. 
147 See id. 
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III. THE 2007 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE 
RESOLUTION 
¶63 The European Parliament Resolution of March 13, 2007,148 was in 
certain ways a virulent response to the 2005 Commission Recommendation. 
However, it should be noted in advance that a significant part of the 
Parliament’s dissatisfaction derived from its belief that the Commission 
“failed to undertake a broad and thorough consultation process with 
interested parties and with Parliament before adopting the 
Recommendation,”149 which is “formally unacceptable” under European 
Law because “the Recommendation clearly goes further than merely 
interpreting or supplementing existing rules.”150 
¶64 But the Parliament also departs from the Commission’s substantive 
approach to cross-border rights management regulation. It sees this moment 
as the opportunity to regulate a broader reality:  
whilst the Recommendation is intended to cover only the online 
sale of music recordings, its broad wording also covers other 
online services (such as broadcasters' services) which happen to 
include music from such recordings but which would suffer from 
the legal uncertainty that the Recommendation creates as to which 
licensing regime would apply to such services.151  
¶65 One of the measures that the Parliament will require the 
Commission to do after the initial considerations is to come up with a 
scheme that guarantees the efficiency and coherence of licensing systems, 
for example, “by enabling broadcasters to acquire rights in accordance with 
the copyright legislation of the Member State in which the program in 
question originates and simplify the extension of existing collective 
agreements so as to include interactive online distribution of existing 
content (e.g. podcasting).”152 
¶66 Besides the different approach regarding the scope of cross-border 
regulation, the Parliament also believes that the freedom of choice so highly 
emphasized by the Commission should be “accompanied by appropriate 
measures to safeguard and promote the diversity of cultural expression, 
                                                     
148 European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on the Commission 
Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, T6-
0064/2007, [herinafter European Parliament Resolution] available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-
2007-0064&language=EN. 
149 Id. ¶ A. 
150 Id. ¶ B. 
151 Id. ¶ W. 
152 Id. No. 6 (emphasis added). 
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notably by offering users, via one and the same collecting society, large 
diversified repertoires, including local and niche repertoires and in 
particular the world repertoire for broadcasters’ services.”153 This is a 
concern in the July 2005 Working Paper, but that as a matter of policy was 
practically absent from the May 2005 Recommendation, which makes little 
sense. 
¶67 The Parliament departs from the criticism in Towse and Handke’s 
article, stating it is important to preserve the “existing system of reciprocal 
agreements and the reciprocal collection of royalties . . . so that competition 
is introduced on the basis of the efficiency and quality of the services that 
collective rights management societies can offer.”154 It also considers that 
“the system of reciprocal representation agreements should be maintained, 
as it enables all commercial and individual users without discrimination to 
have equal access to the world repertoire, ensures better protection for the 
right-holders, guarantees real cultural diversity and stimulates fair 
competition in the internal market.”155 However, this is not a radically 
opposite view to the one presented by the economic analysis of collecting 
societies. From the Parliament’s perspective, monopolies may indeed occur 
in this segment of the internal market, but their negative outputs are 
avoidable: “with regard to possible abuses of monopolies, there is a need for 
better governance of some collective rights management societies through 
improved solidarity, transparency, non-discrimination, fair and balanced 
representation of each category of right-holders and accountability rules 
combined with appropriate control mechanisms in Member States.”156 
Simultaneously, while favoring the existence of a plurality of competing 
entities, the Parliament associates the need to prevent forum-shopping with 
the above mentioned principles. 157 
                                                     
153 Id.  ¶ M. 
154 European Parliament Resolution, supra note 151, ¶ N. 
155 Id. ¶ O. It also invites the Commission to design a licensing scheme that 
should “avoid the over-centralization of market powers and repertoires by 
ensuring that exclusive mandates may not be granted to a single or a very few 
collective rights management societies by major right-holders, thereby 
guaranteeing that the global repertoire remains available to all collective rights 
management societies for the granting of licenses to users.” Id. at No. 6. Number 
7 of the Resolution presents even more assertive language: “it is crucial to 
prohibit any form of exclusive mandate between major right-holders and 
collective rights management societies for the direct collection of royalties in all 
Member States, as this would lead to the rapid extinction of national collective 
rights management societies and undermine the position of minority repertoires 
and cultural diversity in Europe,” Id. at No. 7. 
156 Id. ¶ R. 
157 ‘Forum-shopping’ is defined as “users seeking out the collective rights 
management society that provides the cheapest licenses.” Id. ¶ Q. 
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¶68 As a result of these considerations, the Parliament invites the 
Commission “to make it clear that the 2005 Recommendation applies 
exclusively to online sales of music recordings,”158 and to present “a 
proposal for a flexible framework directive to be adopted by Parliament and 
the Council.”159 Besides the principles that the Recommendation itself had 
sought to address (freedom of choice, transparency, equitable 
remuneration), the Parliament particularly stresses the importance of 
stimulating cultural diversity. In an interesting move, it ties this goal with 
the necessity of avoiding “downward pressure on authors’ revenues.”160 
This downward pressure on royalty levels will be avoided by “ensuring that 
users are licensed on the basis of the tariff applicable in the country where 
the consumption of the copyrighted work (the so-called “country of 
destination”) will take place, and help to achieve an appropriate level of 
royalties for the rights-holders.”161 
¶69 Finally, the Parliament underlines the need to create an “alternative 
dispute resolution” mechanism, a system that shall be “effective and 
inexpensive” in order to avoid burdening users, particularly small and 
medium-sized ones, with unreasonable costs.162 
¶70 The Parliament’s non-legislative Resolution is therefore both a 
critic to and an improvement of the 2005 Recommendation. Ultimately, it 
builds on many of the concepts and principles to which the Commission 
resorted, sharing its underlying pro-competition approach to online rights 
management across Europe. 
¶71 Once again, everything lies in the hands of the Commission, a move 
that makes this story a rather circular one; circularity that brings us to the 
beginning of a series of events materializing into another opportunity of 
aiming and shooting at the right target. However, in Europe’s case, 
returning to the departing point will not exactly be a second chance. By 
missing the first train, Europe missed the opportunity to shape the market – 
for instance, if cultural diversity was one of the choices, by embedding it ab 
initio in the system. This leads us to one last question: can Europe’s future 
legislation on cross-border rights management be based on assumptions that 
were made in 2004 and 2005 when that market was in its big bang period, 
or should Europe start considering other solutions? Let us enunciate a (for 
the time being, a remote but not impossible) possibility: Europe has had a 
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Community Trademark since 1996, and the system has been working fairly 
well.163 Should this experience teach anything to Copyright Law? Certainly, 
it does not suggest there should be a European Copyright – at least not in a 
near future – but perhaps it could inspire a different online music licensing 
system than the one the Commission has been pursuing. It could imply 
abandoning the pro-competition approach and adopting a model closer to 
Towse and Handke’s, with some sort of central European Office that 
nonetheless could integrate the existing major European collecting societies. 
¶72 And while this option depends on the economic approach that we 
might relate to the role of collecting societies and to the role that new 
technologies play in a regional but still State–based system, there is yet 
another reason for us to consider the possibility of having a centralized 
rights management scheme and abolishing every kind of intra-State 
representation agreements – today’s music distribution is not merely 
borderless, it is actively anti-territorial, which means it might be a good 
time to consider this an area where the old principle of territoriality simply 
does not make sense. 
CONCLUSIONS: TERRITORIALITY RECONFIGURATED 
¶73 The path followed by the European Commission regarding the 
creation of a pan-European license was portrayed in this article as a rather 
disappointing one, a sentiment which seems to be shared by scholars and 
those who work in the music business alike. Nonetheless, Europe’s 
institutional awareness to the problem of collecting societies relying on old 
fashioned law and therefore following old fashioned business models did 
have the merit of attracting scholarly and social debate to this issue. Too 
meager a merit, it is true, particularly if we consider that the phenomenon of 
legitimate online music services hit the European market and started 
spreading around at a steadfast pace since 2004 regardless of the passivity 
of the law. In any event, the Recommendation did trigger the Parliament’s 
attention, leading to a Resolution that seems to shed some light on the 
profile of a future pan-European license, applicable not only to the music 
field but also to most of the services that rely on the latest communication 
technologies. 
¶74 That being said, it is at least questionable that the Resolution’s 
proposals will smoothly materialize into European copyright law in the near 
future. Regardless of the position that we choose to adopt in the 
                                                     
163 The Office in Alicante received 43,000 applications in 1996; in 2007 the 
number surpassed 80,000. Trade Marks and Designs Registration Office of the 
European Union, Statistics of Community Trade Marks 2007, Overview of 
Applications, SSC009.01, http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/office/SSC009-
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confrontation between competition and natural monopolies, the 
Commission’s stammering Recommendation is clearly a sign of immaturity. 
Non-binding recommendations and non-legislative resolutions are welcome, 
but their nature limits their weight.  As the Working Document would put 
it: it is better to have the European institutions busy with this issue than 
having them doing nothing about it.164 Europe’s incapacity to seize the 
opportunity to regulate – or de-regulate, had that been the option – a new 
market when it first started to blossom, in a twirl of legal uncertainty and 
surrounded by the negative effects of music piracy, is not merely due to the 
Community’s structural limitations imposed by the founding treaties. The 
fact that European copyright law has to resort to competition law to face 
some of its limitations is one of the sides of the coin; the other is that, while 
acknowledging that “the loss of territoriality brought about by the Internet” 
is “difficult to reconcile with traditional copyright licensing schemes,”165 
Europe is not departing from those schemes and is reading the principle of 
territoriality in the old-fashioned way. 
¶75 More than the anxious response to technologies that are changing 
the way we communicate and our business models, the core question of 
cross-border right management lies in our relationship with the old 
paradigm of territoriality. And yet, although copyright is closely associated 
with territoriality, there is no longer very much in its essence that imposes 
territoriality per se, particularly in a world that the Internet and technology 
have rendered borderless. If we kept the same copyright rules for the next 
millennium and if by the end of that time the entire world officially spoke 
and wrote in Esperanto, there would probably be a couple of publishing 
houses operating at a worldwide level, just as today the largest Anglo-
American publishing houses hold or co-hold the copyrights of the books 
they publish in most (if not all) of English speaking countries. It would be 
nonsense to say that these worldwide Esperanto publishers were bound by 
territoriality, no matter how many licenses and agreements they had to enter 
into (fault of an inefficient coordination of the substantive national laws) in 
order to be able to do business worldwide. 
¶76 In its own particular way, music is Esperanto. The fact that it is 
being delivered instantaneously via digital means, unlike the hard-copy 
books in the example, should reinforce the idea that our assumptions 
regarding the role of territoriality have to be smoothened by the evidence 
that pops out of the real world.  
¶77 When Berne abolished the formalities in order to get a copyright 
over a creative work, it was telling us that copyright was not patent law and 
                                                     
164 See discussion supra notes 94–101and accompanying text (discussing the 
problems with “doing nothing”). 
165 Press Release, Europa, supra note 2. 
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that territoriality had its practical – and also theoretical – limits. When 
copyright management societies (even if ineptly) tried to form regional 
alliances in order to develop more expeditious business models, they were 
telling us that practice wants to be free of territorial constraints. Particularly 
recent history is telling us that the principle of territoriality cannot act as a 
barrier to commerce and innovation; that territoriality was a consequence of 
the time in which copyright was born, rather than its inseparable 
characteristic. Therefore, the principle needs to be reread in light of the 
recent developments. Which may tell us, after all, that territoriality might 
not be – or should not be, at the very least – a principle anymore. 
¶78 Even if Esperanto book publishers had to get into a web of 
agreements due to territoriality constraints, their activity would not be 
territorial in nature; accordingly, copyrights could still be formally 
territorial, but in practice their territorial component would be significantly 
lessened by the way that the market operated. We could say that 
territoriality was still a part of the legal system, but the concept would 
basically translate its reminiscences, not its essence. Until the 21st century, 
territoriality was regarded as principle because it was a part of the copyright 
system modus operandi; now it has become a barrier to the system. We 
should not keep talking of territoriality as a principle in those areas where 
technology has created widespread distribution methods such as 
downloading, methods that are borderless in nature and that are the basis of 
an entire business model. The somewhat hesitant, still uncoordinated steps 
that we are witnessing in Europe are the beginning of the trend towards a 
demolition of territorial barriers. The law will probably get there after the 
market does, but it will eventually get there – and maybe a future article on 
these issues will be even called territoriality lost.  
 
